Carson College of Business Faculty Directory

Carson College Directory

Marc Cussatt

Assistant Professor


Phone: (509) 335-5391
Office: TODD 237E


  • PhD (University of Colorado at Boulder)
  • Other (Bucknell University)

Marc Cussatt

Marc Cussatt is an assistant professor in the Department of Accounting where he teaches undergraduate financial accounting courses as well as doctoral seminars focusing on archival financial accounting research. Marc's primary research interests are defined benefit pension accounting and the reporting of other comprehensive income (OCI) items. Some of Marc's current research investigates whether the practice of "recycling" pension related other comprehensive income components through net income provides financial statement users with useful information. Marc also has research focusing on the topics of conditional conservatism of earnings, fair value accounting, corporate governance, real earnings management, and international accounting standards. Prior to entering academia, Marc worked for PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP in New York City.

Research Interests

accounting convergence issues
accounting standard setting
conditional conservatism of earnings
corporate governance
fair value accounting
financial accounting
international accounting standards
other comprehensive income
pension accounting
real earnings management
recycling of other comprehensive income

Teaching Interests

financial accounting

Journal Articles

  • M. Cussatt, T. Pollard, L. Huang Accounting Quality under U.S. GAAP vs. IFRS: The Case of Germany Journal of International Accounting Research, 2018
  • J. Black, Z. Chen, M. Cussatt The Association between SFAS No. 157 Fair Value Hierarchy Information and Conditional Accounting Conservatism The Accounting Review, 2018
  • Z. Chen, M. Cussatt, K. Gunny When are Outside Directors More Effective Monitors? - Evidence from Real Activities Manipulation Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 2017


    • Frank Selto, Marc Cussatt Discussion of corporate governance reform and executive incentives: Implications for investments and risk taking